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The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the extent to which auditor-client relations and 
discounting on initial audit engagements undermine audit quality.  While it has been claimed that 
close auditor-client relations undermine auditor independence and erodes audit quality, I find no 
evidence of this.  This suggests that controls implemented by regulators, the profession and audit 
firms are operating effectively and the regulation prescribing auditor rotation is likely 
unnecessary.  In relation to the concern that discounting on initial audit engagements erodes 
audit quality, I find that there are fee increases in periods subsequent to initial audit engagements 
and this suggests concerns that price pressure arising from discounting undermines audit quality 
are overstated. These results suggest that many of the concerns expressed about the threats to 
audit quality are misdirected. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
